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IN MEMORIAL 
 
 
On May 7, 2002, 42 year old 
Walpole Island Police 
Constable Paul Neudert died 
as a result of an on duty 
traffic collision. Two officers 
from the Walpole Island 
police force were heading to 
the Petrolia OPP office to do 
administrative work at the time of the incident. The 
officers, Constable Neudert and Sergeant Lyle 
Johnson were not on a call or involved in a police chase. 
The two vehicles, a car and a SUV, collided at an 
intersection north of Wallaceburg. Both vehicles then 
slid into a deep ditch. The car came to rest on its roof 
in 30 cm. of water.  
 
Constable Neudert, who served six years with the 
Walpole and Hamilton-Wentworth forces, died in the 
crash. He is survived by his wife and two young 
children. Constable Neudert is the first Walpole police 
officer to die on duty and the sixth officer  to die on 
duty this year in Canada. 
 
The above information was provided with the 
permission of Officer Down Memorial Page: available at 
www.odmp.org/canada. 
 
INVESTIGATIVE SEARCH 
REASONABLE: CONVICTIONS 
UPHELD 
R. v. Cooke & Jaworski, 
2002 BCCA 305 
 
A police officer, on patrol in 
a
t
a
o
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recently occurred at the Subway. A male suspect 
dressed in a grey sweatshirt with a hood and a nylon 
covering his face, entered the restaurant armed with a 
small revolver. The suspect produced a small black bag 
with a zipper into which the Subway employee placed 
the contents of the cash register; approximately $160 
in $5 bills. The suspect then fled from the Subway on 
foot. The employee turned out the lights and called 
911. Before proceeding to a checkpoint 4-6 km away 
from the Subway, the officer who saw the van made a 
mental note of it and broadcast its description as a 
“dark brown beater” with a licence plate containing the 
letters “BTL”. 
 
Another officer proceeded to a checkpoint about a 
ten-minute drive from the Subway on Glenmore Rd. 
Within a minute or two the first vehicle, a dark blue 
older van with licence plate BLL151 arrived. The 
accused Jaworski was driving and the accused Cooke 
was in the passenger seat. The officer queried 
Jarowski on CPIC after obtaining his driver’s licence 
and learned he had some connection with the offence 
of robbery. After backup arrived, the accused were 
asked to get out and the van was searched. In plain 
view on the passenger seat, where Cooke was previously 
seated, police found a black zippered bag with $5 bills. 
Police confirmed the amount of money found in the bag 
corresponded with what was taken from the robbery 
and the accused were arrested. The police obtained a 
search warrant for the van and subsequently located a 
nylon and a revolver behind the wood paneling on the 
van’s ceiling. A search of the area also resulted in a 
grey hooded sweatshirt, tearaway pants, and a denim 
jacket being found on Glenmore Rd. between the 
checkpoint and the restaurant.  
 
The accused Cooke later told police that they were in 
the area of the Subway smoking a joint when a man 
V
JWinfield BC, passed a Subway 
restaurant noticing its lights were 
out and a van about a 100 metres 
way, on the same side, pull out of an alleyway and 
ravel along the highway. The officer followed the van 
 short distance until it turned right off the highway 
nto Glenmore Rd. At about this time, the officer 
eard the broadcast of an armed robbery that had 
leaving the restaurant carrying a black pouch and 
wearing black pants and a grey hooded jacket under a 
denim jacket dropped the bag after Cooke called to the 
man. Cooke picked up the bag and found the money. The 
accused were both convicted of robbery and Cooke 
with being masked while committing an indictable 
offence. They appealed their convictions to the British 
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 Columbia Court of Appeal arguing that the roadside 
search by the police was unreasonable and it 
consequently tainted the subsequent issuance of the 
search warrant.  
 
The police may detain persons for the purpose of police 
investigation prior to arrest provided they have 
“sufficient objective evidence that the [persons] were 
recently involved in a crime “. This has been described 
as an “articulable cause”. However, a subjective belief 
alone is not enough; the officer’s belief must also be 
based on objectively discernible facts providing 
reasonable cause to suspect the person might have 
been involved in the criminal activity under 
investigation. In this case, the officer knew the 
Subway had been robbed with a firearm, that a van had 
been seen leaving the area, and that the accused’s van 
arrived at his location in about the time it would have 
taken to drive from the restaurant. Furthermore, two 
of the letters in the licence plate matched the van 
leaving the area of the Subway, there was almost no 
other traffic in the semi rural area, the van was the 
first vehicle to arrive at the checkpoint, and the driver 
had some past connection with the crime of robbery.  
Finch, C.J.B.C. for the unanimous British Columbia 
Court of Appeal stated: 
 
[T]his combination of objectively discernible facts  fully 
justified the police in detaining the occupants of the van, 
and conducting a search on the spot. The timing of the 
events, the description of the van and its direction of 
travel on Glenmore Road were sufficient to meet the 
test. The fact that the crime under investigation involved 
the use of a firearm adds to the justification for the 
detention and search. 
 
The search was lawful and the evidence was admissible. 
Moreover, the subsequent issuance of the search 
warrant was founded on reasonable grounds and the 
evidence obtained there from was also admissible. The 
appeal was dismissed. 
 
Complete case available at www.bcourts.gov.bc.ca 
 
COURT CAUTIONS OVER USE 
OF ‘SHOW-UP’ 
R. v. Hurley, [2002] N.J. No. 119 
 
The accused was charged with theft 
and attempt theft after he was 
identified by two witnesses who saw 
him enter and search two vehicles 
that did not belong to him. The 
identification of the accused by the witnesses 
occurred after he consented to the police bringing the 
two witnesses back to the crime scene to identify (or 
not identify) him while he was seated alone in the rear 
of the police car. This type of identification is known 
as a “confrontation” or “show-up”. In Court, the two 
witnesses testified about their observations that day 
which could at best be described as “uncertain”. 
Although the judge described the witnesses as honest, 
there were some inconsistencies in their evidence and 
what they told police the day of the incident.  
 
In describing the identification of the accused as “the 
equivalent of a multiple choice test in which the answer 
is underlined or set out in bold”, the Court recognized 
the weaknesses of eyewitness identification. 
Eyewitness testimony must be weighed and even though 
a witness may be honest and credible, identification 
evidence suffers from inherent human-frailty and must 
be carefully assessed. Furthermore, the police role in 
ensuring the integrity of the identification process 
must not be undermined by using improper 
identification techniques. In weighing eyewitness 
identification, a Court will assess factors including: 
 
• the opportunity to observe; 
• the witness’ powers of observation; 
• the witness’ actual observations; 
• the witness’ actual recollection; 
• the witness’ ability to relate recollection; and 
• the sincerity of the witnesses testimony 
 
Gorman, J. opined that the “show-up” technique used by 
the police in this case “should rarely, if ever, be used”. 
It negatively impacted the weight to be given to the 
witnesses’ testimony and the judge was unable to 
conclude that identification had been proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt. The accused was acquitted. 
 
ROADSIDE SCREENING 
SUSPICION v. BREATHALYSER 
OPINION 
R. v. Hodgson 2002 MBQB 111 
 
The accused was stopped by the 
police for a speeding violation. As 
the accused was getting his driver’s 
licence, the officer noted a 
moderate odour of alcohol on his 
breath, a blushed face, watery eyes, and difficulty in 
getting his wallet. Having formed the opinion that the 
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 accused had been drinking, but not enough for a 
breathalyser demand, the officer requested the 
accused provide a sample of breath into a roadside-
screening device. Upon exiting his vehicle, the accused 
was unsteady on his feet and was swaying. After failing 
the screening test, the officer formed the opinion that 
his ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired. The 
accused was arrested for impaired driving, advised of 
his rights, and given the breath demand. The accused 
agreed to take the test and provided samples of 
100mg% and 120mg%. The accused appealed his 
conviction at trial of over 80mg% arguing, among other 
grounds, that the judge erred in concluding the officer 
had reasonable and probable grounds under s.254 of 
the Criminal Code to make the demand. 
 
The grounds necessary for demanding a roadside 
sample and a breathalyser sample are different. A 
roadside sample requires a reasonable suspicion of 
alcohol in a driver’s body while a breathalyser demand 
requires reasonable and probable grounds that within 
the preceding 3 hours the driver’s ability is impaired or 
that they had or have over 80mg% of alcohol in their 
blood. Beard J. of the Manitoba Court of Queen’s 
Bench found that the accused’s blushed face, watery 
eyes, moderate alcoholic breath odour, and difficulty in 
getting his wallet established a reasonable suspicion 
justifying the roadside demand.  Furthermore, without 
the roadside screening test, the fact the accused was 
speeding and his unsteadiness and swaying on the way 
to the police car would support reasonable and probable 
grounds to make the breathalyser demand. The appeal 
was dismissed and the conviction was upheld. 
 
PROOF OF FIREARM INFERRED 
FROM FACTS 
R. v. Carlson, 
(2002) Docket:C36150 (OntCA) 
 
The accused appealed his convictions 
including one count of pointing a 
firearm where he argued, among 
other grounds, that there was no 
evidence that the gun used during an 
armed bank robbery was a firearm within the meaning 
of s.2 of the Criminal Code. In his appeal, the onus was 
on the accused to establish “that there was no 
evidence upon which a jury could reasonably conclude 
the handgun brandished by the [accused]…was a 
firearm”. In dismissing the appeal, Ontario’s highest 
Court found that the brandishing, waving, and pointing 
of the gun during the course of the robbery while 
screaming that it was a “hold-up” and demanding money, 
along with witness descriptions of a “small”, “black” gun 
with a 6-8 inch muzzle and the accused’s access to guns 
as reported by his accomplice and common-law spouse, 
was sufficient to support a finding that the hand gun 
was by definition a “firearm”. The accused’s appeal was 
dismissed. 
 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca 
 
REASONABLE GROUNDS: AN 
HONEST BELIEF IN SERIOUS 
POSSIBILITY BASED ON 
CREDIBLE EVIDENCE 
Gregory v. Canada 2002 CFT 420 
 
The plaintiff brought an action 
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alleging that her Charter rights 
were violated when she was 
unreasonably searched by Canada 
ustoms at an international airport and denied an 
pportunity to contact counsel when she was detained 
nd arrested. The plaintiff, a Canadian citizen, arrived 
t Pearson International airport after returning from a 
 week stay in Jamaica where she attended her aunt’s 
uneral on a ticket purchased by her boyfriend a week 
rior to her departure. She produced her airline ticket 
nd declaration form after being questioned by 
ustoms officers regarding her trip; she declared 
ottles of alcohol. After leaving primary inspection, the 
laintiff was randomly approached by a member of 
ustom’s roving Flexible Response Team (FRT). He 
sked the plaintiff questions concerning her trip; 
ength of absence, the purchase of her ticket, and 
mount of luggage. The officer noted that the 
laintiff’s Custom referral card had been coded for 
xcess alcohol.  fter picking up her luggage, the plaintiff arrived at 
he secondary inspection area where the FRT member 
et her. The officer emptied her purse onto a desk 
nd examined a duffle bag containing liquor. The 
fficer noted one of the bottles had a separation in 
he liquid or a foreign object inside the bottle, which 
as visible through the opaque glass in the bottle neck. 
his appeared familiar to the officer in his 
xperiences in finding liquid cocaine in rum bottles. The 
3
 officer opened the bottle and saw what he believed to 
be liquid cocaine. The plaintiff was arrested after the 
officer concluded he had reasonable grounds based on 
the following factors: 
 
• the plaintiff arrived from a drug source country; 
• her bag had been checked in late; 
• her flight was a high risk drug flight; 
• she was traveling alone; 
• he believed (although erroneously) that her ticket 
had been purchased the day before she left 
Jamaica; and  
• she appeared to be carrying contraband drugs. 
 
The plaintiff was handcuffed to prevent injury to the 
plaintiff, the officer, and anyone else in the area and 
to eliminate any risk of flight. The plaintiff was also 
advised of her right to remain silent and of the right 
to a lawyer. The plaintiff protested her innocence and 
repeatedly told the officer to check her receipt that 
she purchased the bottle from a duty free shop, but 
was ignored.  The plaintiff was escorted to an isolated, 
controlled room and the handcuffs were removed.  The 
contents of the bottle were examined and a drug test 
was negative. The plaintiff was released after receiving 
an apology for the inconvenience. As a result of her 
ordeal, the plaintiff was shaken, had difficulty 
sleeping, and was left traumatized.  
 
Was the Search Unreasonable? 
 
The Federal Court Judge found that “airline 
passengers impliedly consent to be interrogated and 
searched when [they] go through customs”. There was 
no evidence to suggest that the plaintiff was 
improperly singled out for inspection because of the 
presence of significant drug courier indicators. The 
Court stated that, “from an objective point of view, 
[the plaintiff] fit the profile of a drug smuggler, albeit 
unwittingly”. 
 
Was the Plaintiff Denied her Right to Counsel? 
 
The plaintiff was properly told that she had the right 
to remain silent and of her right to a lawyer. The judge 
was satisfied that she was properly informed, 
understood her rights, and declined to exercise them. 
 
Did the Officer Have Sufficient Cause? 
 
A peace officer may arrest a person upon reasonable 
grounds of an offence being committed. Here, the 
officer had reasonable grounds that the plaintiff was 
smuggling cocaine. His “honest belief in a serious 
possibility, based on credible evidence, that a criminal 
offence [had] been committed” went beyond mere 
suspicion and was sufficient to justify the arrest. 
 
Was Handcuffing Justified? 
 
To justify the use of restraints, a peace officer must 
establish a reasonable basis for doing so. In testifying 
that he was attempting to eliminate any possibility of 
escape or injury, the officer “was reasonable in 
concluding that the handcuffs were required”. Even 
though the possibility of escape is difficult to gauge, 
the Court refused to second-guess the officer. 
Furthermore, “the interests of enforcement officers 
in ensuring their personal safety and that of the 
detained person and the public must be taken into 
account”. However, the Court did not adopt the use of 
handcuffs in all circumstances: 
 
My decision should not be interpreted as condoning a 
blanket policy of handcuffing suspected persons. The 
public expects enforcement officers to set high 
standards of truthfulness and honour; while 
demonstrating a devotion to duty.  They also expect that 
the officers will be responsible and accountable in their 
use of the powers provided by law. The unvarying use of 
handcuffs on all persons arrested without regard for the 
seriousness of the offence, a reasonable apprehension of 
violence, risk of escape, or the condition of the arrested 
person is improper. (emphasis added) 
 
The plaintiff’s action was dismissed. 
 
TESTIMONY USING 
INADMISSIBLE TRANSCRIPT 
ALLOWED 
R. v. Fliss, 2002 SCC 16 
 
Police entered into an elaborate 
undercover operation to befriend 
the accused, who had become a 
suspect in the death of a woman 
found murdered. After inserting themselves into the 
accused’s life, undercover police officers posing as 
members of the criminal element and acting on an 
authorization to intercept, surreptitiously recorded a 
murder confession the accused made while he met the 
officers in a hotel room. Following the recording, a 
transcript was prepared and reviewed by one of the 
officers the following day. After proofreading the 
transcript, the officer made corrections from his own 
personal recollections of what was said as well as 
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 listening to the tape. This corrected copy was sent 
back to be retyped. At trial, the judge found the 
authorization to intercept should not have been issued 
and the tape recording and transcripts violated s.8 of 
the Charter and were consequently inadmissible as a 
remedy under s.24(2). However, because the officer 
had participated in the conversation and the 
corrections were made on the basis of fresh memory at 
the time, the judge ruled that the officer could refer 
to the corrected transcripts (or “notes”) to refresh his 
memory at trial. In his testimony, the officer 
essentially read the excluded transcript word for word. 
The accused appealed the admissibility of the officer’s 
evidence arguing it was so inextricably entwined with 
the excluded evidence that the officer’s testimony 
itself should not be allowed. After the accused’s appeal 
was dismissed by the British Columbia Court of Appeal 
(2:1), he launched a further appeal to the Supreme 
Court of Canada. Although the Supreme Court of 
Canada unanimously dismissed his appeal, the judges did 
so for different reasons. 
 
The Majority Reasoning 
 
Binnie J., writing for the majority (4:3), held that the 
court “was entitled to hear from the undercover 
officer about his conversation” because the officer 
had a present recollection of the “gist” of all its 
important elements. In deciding whether the officer’s 
use of the transcript to refresh his memory was 
permissible, Binnie J. wrote: 
There is also no doubt that the officer was entitled to 
refresh his memory by any means that would rekindle his 
recollection, whether or not the stimulus itself 
constituted admissible evidence. This is because it is his 
recollection, not the stimulus, that becomes evidence. 
The stimulus may be hearsay, it may itself be largely 
inaccurate, it may be nothing more than the sight of 
someone who had been present or hearing some music 
that had played in the background. If the recollection 
here had been stimulated by hearing a tape of his 
conversation with the accused, even if the tape was made 
without valid authorization, the officer's recollection -- 
not the tape -- would be admissible. 
However, in this case the officer could not 
independently recall at trial all of the conversation 
from present memory nor did he at the time he 
proofread the transcript the day following the 
recording. Since the officer only had a partial, although 
substantial, recollection of the conversation, he was 
not entitled to recite the entire transcript. It was not 
because the transcript was inadmissible that precluded 
its use as a memory aid, but that it failed to stimulate 
the officer’s recollection. Furthermore, the officer’s 
testimony failed to meet all the criteria of the “past 
recollection recorded” doctrine. The doctrine, 
commonly used by police to refresh their memory from 
notes made during or shortly after an event, requires 
the following: 
 
1. the recollection must be reliably recorded; 
2. the recollection must be sufficiently fresh and 
vivid at the time to be probably accurate; 
3. the officer must be able to assert while giving 
testimony that the recorded recollection 
represented their knowledge at the time; and 
4. the original record of the recollection itself must 
be used, if procurable.  
 
Here, the 3rd requirement was not met. The officer 
testified that he could only recall parts of the 
conversation at the time he made the corrections to 
the tape. By allowing the officer to read into evidence 
those parts of the transcript he did not remember 
when he made the corrections violated the accused’s 
rights. It was not the officer’s recollection, but the 
excluded tape and transcript that provided the sole 
basis for the parts he could not remember: 
[A]  significant portion of the detail that was recited by 
the officer into the record cannot be considered to be 
his recollection (either refreshed, revived or recorded) 
but the corrected transcript of the ...  conversation that 
… was obtained in breach of s. 8 of the Charter. 
Having found the accused’s s.8 rights violated by 
reading in the transcript, the majority nonetheless 
admitted the evidence under s.24(2) of the Charter 
after assessing the following factors: 
 
• the evidence was non-conscriptive; 
• the accused was not detained nor compelled to 
confess -- the statement was freely volunteered; 
• the surreptitious recording did not cause or 
contribute to the statement; 
• the officer did not hear anything the accused did 
not intend him to hear; 
• the police would have heard what the accused had 
to say with or without a recording device; 
• the officer recalled all the most significant 
elements of what was said; 
• the police acted in good faith – they obtained 
prior judicial authorization even though it was 
subsequently ruled invalid; 
• the act of volunteering the statements indicated a 
low expectation of privacy; and 
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 • murder is the most serious of crimes – this 
murder was brutal and senseless. 
 
The Minority Reasoning 
 
Arbour J., although coming to the same conclusion in 
dismissing the appeal and admitting the evidence, found 
it unnecessary to reconsider s. 24(2) of the Charter—
the trial judge had properly addressed the s.8 breach. 
Although the recording and transcript of the 
conversation were the products of an unreasonable 
search and seizure and thus inadmissible, the 
conversation itself was not and the officer was only 
entitled to refresh his memory from the excluded 
transcript if he testified that the transcript 
constituted his past recollection recorded (which was 
not the case for all of the parts of the transcript). 
However, even though the Court erred in permitting 
the officer to read verbatim into evidence the 
contents of the transcript, the error was trivial 
because no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice 
occurred.  
 
A Supreme Warning—closing the back door 
 
It would appear on its face that the police could 
deliberately circumvent the authorization process by 
simply recording a conversation, check the transcript, 
and then rely on the transcript as notes to later be 
read in at trial even though the tape itself is 
inadmissible. However, both the majority and minority 
cautioned against such procedure. Binnie J. cautioned 
that in another case, “the s. 24(2) hurdle may not be so 
readily surmounted” while Arbour J. forewarned that in 
a different scenario, any evidence given in any form 
about the content of the conversation may well be 
excluded.  
 
Complete case available at www.scc-csc.gc.ca 
 
WHEN DOES FIREARM “USE” 
END AND “STORAGE” BEGIN? 
R. v. Carlos, 2002 SCC 35 
 
Police conducted a search of the 
search, police found a loaded Ruger .357 Magnum 
revolver without a trigger lock wrapped in a rag and 
placed in a plastic bag behind a stereo cabinet on the 
upper floor in the living room. Police also located two 
other loaded revolvers, again without trigger locks, 
locked in a gun safe situated on the lower floor of the 
home. The accused was subsequently charged with 
careless storage of the .357 Magnum and two counts of 
storage in contravention of the regulations for the 
other handguns.  
 
At trial1, the accused testified that he had taken the 
guns out to clean, inspect and admire and had loaded all 
three guns to check them for corrosion. He took the 
.357 upstairs to his office to check the documentation 
against the serial number. The arrival of the police was 
unexpected, caught him by surprise, and he panicked 
when his wife told him the police were coming to the 
door. He only had enough time to put the two guns that 
were downstairs in the safe without unloading them and 
the .357 he took from his office and hid it behind the 
stereo cabinet. To obtain convictions on all three 
counts, the Crown would need to prove the following: 
 
• the revolvers were firearms; 
• the revolvers were restricted or prohibited; 
• the revolvers were loaded; and 
• the revolvers were stored (for the .357, 
“careless” storage also had to be established) 
 
In recognizing that the terms “store” and “storage” are 
not defined in the legislation, the trial judge accepted 
the meaning of “store” as “to reserve, put away, or set 
aside for future use”. In failing to find that the 
firearms were “stored”, the judge reasoned that the 
accused had planned to unload all of the guns and place 
them in the safe had the police not arrived 
unexpectedly as they did. The placing of the gun behind 
the stereo was described as a “very ill-planned hiding 
spot” and all the charges were dismissed. In short, the 
placing of the guns was simply interrupted “use” and did 
not amount to “storage”. 
 
The Crown’s appeal to the Yukon Court of Appeal2 was 
dismissed (2:1). Proudfoot J., writing for the majority, 
agreed with the trial judge that the accused would not accused’s residence with a warrant 
obtained in connection with an 
application for a firearms prohibition 
under s.111 of the Criminal Code 
(resulting from threatening comments allegedly made 
to government officials). As a consequence of the 
have placed the firearms where they were found but 
for the unexpected arrival of the police. Since guns are 
entitled to be handled within the limits of the law, the 
accused’s actions in putting them aside when the police 
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1 See 2000 YTTC 519 
2 See 2001 YKCA 6 
 arrived did not amount to “storage” but was a 
continuation of the handling.  Even though the majority 
described some of his actions as “unnecessary, 
dangerous, and incredibility stupid”, the accused did 
not “store” the weapons. However, the Court noted, had 
the accused been charged with careless “handling”, a 
conviction would have likely followed.  
 
Ryan J., in dissent, found the guns had been stored 
when they were put aside and there was no immediate 
or present use being made of them. In her view, hiding 
the firearms was the same as storing them since the 
accused had “clearly stopped using” them when he put 
them away before answering the door to the police. 
Whatever “use” he was making of the guns had ended, 
and storage, although temporary, had begun.  
 
The Crown again appealed, this time to the Supreme 
Court of Canada. In a unanimous judgment, the 
Supreme Court set aside the acquittals and entered 
convictions on all three counts. Even though there may 
be “circumstances where a short interruption in the 
use or handling of firearms would still constitute 
handling rather than storage”, the accused “took steps 
to put away and hide his weapons such that the proper 
characterization of his actions was that he stored 
them, albeit temporarily, rather than continue his use 
and handling of the firearms in plain view of the police”. 
There is no need to establish long term or permanent 
storage, and the temporary hiding of the guns was 
sufficient in this case. The matter was remitted back 
to the trial judge for sentencing.  
 
Complete case available at www.scc-csc.gc.ca 
 
LOGICAL INFERENCES 
FROM FACTS PROVE 
POSSESSION 
R. v. Zimmerscheld, 2002 BCCA 158 
 
The accused rented a four 
passenger Cessna airplane in 
e
h
h
r
t
p
marihuana and rocks to weigh it down. Also found inside 
the cockpit was a loaded handgun, a navigational map, 
and a GPS unit with a “drop” site programmed into it. 
This site, also circled on the map, was an unpopulated 
rural area near Mount Baker in Washington State close 
to a road. When interviewed a week after the crash, 
the accused denied any knowledge of the drugs on the 
airplane. At trial the accused was convicted of 
possession of marihuana for the purpose of trafficking 
while the passenger, who was also charged, was 
acquitted. The accused appealed his conviction to BC’s 
top court arguing, among other grounds, that the trial 
judge erred in finding the accused in possession of the 
marihuana.  
 
Joint possession under s.4(3)(b) of the Criminal Code 
states: 
 
…where one of two or more persons, with the knowledge and 
consent of the rest, has anything in his custody or possession, 
it shall be deemed to be in the custody and possession of each 
and all of them. 
 
Under this section, knowledge and consent are 
essential, as well as “the coexistence of some measure 
of control”.  
 
Control 
 
At trial, the accused argued that because he was not 
the owner of the plane, “a finding of exclusive control 
of the contents of the plane [could] not be made”. The 
trial judge found that the accused, as pilot, had control 
over the plane and decided who or what cargo would fly 
in the plane. The bag was not in the plane when it was 
rented, was visible from the cockpit, and because of its 
size and location it could not be successfully argued 
that some other person left the bag on the plane 
unbeknownst to the accused.  The British Columbia 
Court of Appeal (BCCA) found the conclusion of the 
trial judge, that the accused had the requisite control, 
well supported by the evidence.  
 
Knowledge 
V
JPemberton and flew it to Squamish 
where he picked up a passenger. 
After leaving Squamish, the plane 
xperienced mechanical problems and crashed beside a 
ighway and both men were transported to the 
ospital. Police, along with other emergency personnel, 
esponded to the crash and found a large duffel bag 
aking up the entire back seat. This bag was not in the 
lane when it was rented and contained $125,000 in 
 
The Crown also was required to prove that the accused 
had knowledge of the contents of the duffle bag. This 
can be established by drawing on inferences that the 
accused knew what was in the bag or that he was 
willfully blind as to its contents. In this case, the trial 
judge concluded that the accused was piloting the plane 
to drop the duffle bag at the location marked on the 
map and entered into the GPS unit. The accused’s 
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 statement denying knowledge was made nine days after 
the crash, with the knowledge the police were 
investigating, after he spoke to a lawyer, and was not 
under oath. Even if the accused was not the person who 
brought the bag onto the aircraft, the trial judge 
found that he knew the plan was to drop the bag out of 
the plane and by not making enquiries as to its 
contents, he was willfully blind which constitutes the 
necessary knowledge. Again, the BCCA found the 
inferences drawn by the trial judge were logical and 
the appeal was dismissed. 
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca 
 
ARREST IN DWELLING 
JUSTIFIED: EVIDENCE IN 
PLAIN VIEW 
R. v. J.K., 2002 BCPC 0160 
 
A police officer attended a home to 
knock  doctrine3. The officer did not exceed the 
implied license at the time he saw the marihuana, which 
was in plain view through the open door. The officer 
had reasonable grounds to believe the bag in the 
accused’s hand was marihuana; there was a rolling paper 
on the table, the substance was green and leafy, and 
the type of bag was the type commonly used for 
marihuana according to the officer. 
 
The Arrest 
 
Since possession of marihuana less than 30 grams is a 
summary conviction offence, the officer could not rely 
on the Criminal Code exigent circumstances provisions 
justifying warrantless entry to effect an arrest 
because the offence was not indictable4. However, the 
officer was justified under s.495 in arresting the 
accused because “he found the accused committing a 
criminal offence and he needed to take action to 
secure the marihuana and prevent the continuation of 
the offence”. 
 speak to a person about a driving 
complaint. The door of the home was 
open and loud music was coming 
from the home. The officer twice 
yelled out the name of the person he wished to speak 
to through the open door. As he knocked or was about 
to knock, he observed the accused, seated at a table 
with another youth, with a bag of marihuana in his 
hand. On the table was a rolling paper and it was 
apparent to the officer that the accused was rolling a 
marihuana cigarette. The officer entered and advised 
the occupants of the home that they were under 
investigation for possession of marihuana, the accused 
was arrested and advised of his Charter rights. The 
bag of marihuana weighing 7.5 grams was seized. The 
accused argued that the evidence of the marihuana 
should be excluded as evidence because the police 
violated his rights when they seized the marihuana 
contrary to s.8 of the Charter. 
 
The Approach to the House 
 
The officer attended the residence not for the 
purpose of conducting a drug search or looking for 
things to be used as evidence of a crime, but for the 
legitimate purpose unrelated to the seizure of the 
marihuana. The officer wanted to communicate with 
the occupant about a driving complaint and was 
legitimately at the door under the implied invitation to 
The Seizure 
 
The plain view doctrine permits a warrantless seizure 
when the following criteria are met: 
 
1. the object is in plain view of the police who have a 
right to be in the position to have the view (the 
marihuana was in view from the open doorway 
where the officer had a right to be through 
implied invitation to knock); 
 
2. the discovery of the incriminating evidence is 
inadvertent (the officer did not go to the door to 
look for marihuana); and 
 
3. it must be immediately apparent the object is 
evidence of a crime (the officer had reasonable 
grounds to believe the object was marihuana – “any 
worldy person would have recognized the accused 
was in the process of rolling a joint”) 
 
Even though there is a high degree afforded persons 
within a dwelling and a general rule that prohibits 
warrantless entry to effect arrests therein, Smith J. 
held that the privacy interest in this case was 
outweighed by societal’s interest “in ensuring adequate 
police protection where [the officer] saw an offence 
under the plain view doctrine”. 
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3 See Volume 1 Issue 1 of this publication for a discussion on “Implied Licence” 
4 See s.529.3(1) of the Criminal Code. 
 Manner of the Search 
 
Prior to entering to make an arrest in a private 
dwelling, the common law requires that the police 
should minimize invasiveness by giving notice of 
presence, authority, and purpose unless they are saving 
someone, preventing the destruction of evidence, or if 
in hot pursuit. In this case, the officer knocked or was 
about to knock on an open door. He needed to act 
quickly and did tell the occupants they were under 
investigation. The occupants recognized him as a police 
officer and the fact he told them he was investigating 
marihuana possession reaffirmed this. Thus, the 
requirements of the common law were satisfied. 
 
The Court concluded that the accused’s Charter right 
protected under s.8 was not breached and the evidence 
of the marihuana was admissible. 
 
Complete case available at www.provincialcourt.bc.ca 
 
“IN SERVICE: 10-8” 
CELEBRATES ONE YEAR 
 
The “In Service: 10-8” 
“Just finished reading the first issue.  Great 
job...short, to the point and pertinent” Police 
Sergeant, British Columbia 
**************** 
“Excellent publication and thanks for putting it on-line 
so everyone can get a copy. The case law you quote is 
not only applicable to British Columbia police officers, 
but also to the rest of us across the Country” Police 
Sergeant, Manitoba 
**************** 
“I have been reading some of your newsletters and 
have found them quite interesting, easy to read and 
relevant”  Police Corporal, RCMP  
**************** 
“I read a couple of your newsletters. Excellent reading! 
I have…yet to see any publication similar to this to 
keep the street officers informed of changes/up-
dates”  Police Sergeant, Ontario  
**************** 
“I just received a copy of the In-Service: 10-8 News 
Letter. Indeed a gold mine of information! We have 
been trying to figure out a way to provide concise case 
law updates to our front line people and this looks like a 
wonderful solution”  Police Corporal, New Brunswick  
**************** 
“I have enjoyed tremendously the case law updates you 
have been posting on the JIBC website. We do not have newsletter has celebrated 
one year of publication in 
serving operational police 
officers across British 
Columbia. In recognition of 
this anniversary, we would like to share some of our 
readers’ comments about the publication: 
*************** 
“I wanted to take a moment to commend you for 
producing such an important educational tool for 
operational police officers.  Your topics are very 
current and…informative without being overly legalistic.  
Keep up the good work!!” Police Constable, British 
Columbia 
************** 
“Just read Vol 1 Issue 3 re Reasonable Grounds.  An 
excellent overview.  This is a refreshing and much 
needed perspective on an important issue….Hopefully, 
information such as this will…boost confidence and 
contribute to better decision making. Keep up the good 
work!”   Police Inspector, British Columbia 
**************** 
“Have read all of the Newsletters which you have 
prepared and I must congratulate on the product 
produced.   All have been excellent reference material 
which has obviously been well researched”  Police 
Chief, British Columbia 
 
that kind of support here…so I have been relying on 
the 10-8 to get the best info” Police Constable, 
Saskatchewan  
**************** 
“I've circulated the last few issues around our office 
and all of us have found it to be very informative.  
Kudos to you!  It is a great tool for us to keep informed 
of the latest case law issues etc.”  Federal Game 
Officer, Environment Canada 
**************** 
“Thank you for the Newsletter “In Service”. We all 
appreciate the case law”  Crown Prosecutor, British 
Columbia 
**************** 
We are pleased by the positive response and feedback 
we have received thus far and look forward to serving 
you in the future!!! 
 
Note-able Quote 
 
“Where the police have nothing but suspicion and no legal 
way to obtain other evidence, it follows that they must 
leave the suspect alone, not charge ahead and obtain 
evidence illegally and unconstitutionally. Where they take 
this latter course, the Charter violation is plainly more 
serious than it would be otherwise, not less5”. SCC Justice 
Sopinka 
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5 R. v. Kokesch [1990] 3 S.C.R. 3  
 CONDITIONAL SENTENCE 
UNFIT FOR ‘HORRIFIC’ CRIME 
R. v. Persaud, 
(2002) Docket:C37620 (OntCA) 
 
The Crown appealed the conditional 
sentence given to the accused after 
he was  convicted of criminal 
negligence causing death when, while 
under the influence of alcohol, he 
sped along a major thoroughfare at a high rate of 
speed, striking the victim with sufficient force to 
severe his legs and impale him on the windshield. The 
accused then fled the scene leaving the victim to bleed 
to death. Furthermore, after arriving home and 
composing himself, the accused did not seek any 
assistance for the victim. Despite the accused’s 
“unblemished background” and prior “good character”, 
the Ontario Court of Appeal substituted a sentence of 
20 months imprisonment. The crime was “horrific” and 
the accused’s behaviour was “callous, irresponsible and 
cowardly” thereby elevating the degree of moral 
blameworthiness and justifying a sentence that 
accurately reflected the gravity and seriousness of the 
crime while also recognizing the sentencing principles 
of denunciation and general deterrence. 
 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca 
 
ANONYMOUS TIP 
INSUFFICIENT TO PROVIDE 
REASONABLE GROUNDS 
R. v. Carlson, 
2002 ABQB 459, 2002 ABQB 464 
 
A drug unit Staff Sergeant received 
an anonymous tip through the 
communications centre that the sale of 
cocaine was taking place outside a 
hotel from an older blue Chrysler bearing a specific 
licence number with four occupants including a named 
female and a 38 year old female driver with short 
brown hair. The hotel was located across the street 
from police headquarters and was known as a location 
where drug dealing was commonplace. The Staff 
Sergeant went to a window in the drug office and could 
clearly see an older blue Chrysler parked outside the 
hotel with three people entering it. A female with dark 
short hair entered the driver’s side door, a second 
female entered the front passenger door, and a male 
entered the rear passenger door.  
 
The Staff Sergeant advised three other officers of 
the tip and asked them to check it out. The officers 
exited the police building, immediately approached the 
vehicle, and advised the occupants they were detained 
under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act in 
order to search the vehicle. The accused, who was 
seated in the driver’s seat, had short brown hair but 
appeared “decades older than 38”. No one in the 
vehicle had the name of the person as provided by the 
anonymous tipster. The two female occupants were 
observed leaning towards each other with the accused 
holding $390 cash in her hand. As a result of a search, 
the police found drug related evidence including 
cocaine in the accused’s purse, $600 between the two 
front seats, and more drugs and paraphernalia in the 
trunk. The occupants were all arrested and informed of 
their rights under the Charter.  
 
Section 11(7) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances 
Act would allow the police to search without a warrant 
if they had a “reasonable belief that the accused was 
in possession of drug contraband” and exigent 
circumstances existed. In assessing whether the 
requisite belief existed, the totality of the 
circumstances must be considered including whether 
the tip was compelling, whether the source was 
credible, and whether the tip was corroborated by the 
police before deciding to search.  
 
Was the tip compelling? 
 
Although the police had knowledge of drug trafficking 
in the area, there was no evidence that the occupants 
of the vehicle had related records or that any of them 
were reputed to be drug users or traffickers. The tip 
that the sale of cocaine was occurring from the car 
was a mere conclusory statement and “no details 
concerning the purported possession and trafficking 
were provided”. Furthermore, the named person 
provided by the tipster was not in the vehicle. 
 
Was the source credible? 
 
The anonymous telephone tipster was not known to the 
police and therefore could not meet any standard of 
reliability.  
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 Was the tip corroborated? 
 
The police, prior to searching the vehicle, obtained no 
additional information, no surveillance was undertaken, 
nor did the police even look through the windows of the 
car before they decided to search. In short, the police 
intended on searching the car before they arrived at 
it. 
 
In this case, the tip was not compelling, credible, nor 
corroborated. Even though the police were faced with 
exigent circumstances because the car could be driven 
away at any moment, they still did not have the 
necessary reasonable grounds to justify the search.   
 
Complete case available at www.alberatcourts.ab.ca 
 
PROTECTIVE SEARCH 
UNREASONABLE, BUT 
EVIDENCE ADMITTED 
R. v. Clements, 2002 ABQB 443 
 
Two police officers observed a 
negative. Further, when asked what was in his pocket, 
the accused’s behaviour markedly changed from rapid-
fire speaking to silence while appearing increasingly 
tense. As a result of the behaviour and noticeable 
bulge, the officer was concerned with his safety and 
informed the accused he would be searched. The police 
found a package with six pieces of crack cocaine. The 
accused was arrested.  
 
Because the search was conducted without a warrant, 
the search was prima facie unreasonable and the onus 
shifted to the police/Crown to demonstrate on a 
balance of probabilities that it was nonetheless 
reasonable. In this case, the accused was simply 
detained at a traffic stop to issue a by-law ticket and 
therefore the search powers attendant to a lawful 
arrest did not apply. However, the common law allows 
the police to search persons who are lawfully detained 
for investigations and where a reasonable apprehension 
of danger exists to warrant a safety search. This 
involves both a subject and objective enquiry.  
 
Johnstone J. of Alberta’s Court of Queen’s Bench 
found the objective standard had not been met. Even 
though the accused displayed nervousness and vehicle being driven from which a 
small white object was thrown from 
the passenger side, followed shortly 
by a similar object thrown from the 
driver’s side. The vehicle was stopped with the 
intention of charging the occupant with a by-law 
infraction for littering. One officer approached the 
driver’s side of the vehicle while his partner 
approached the passenger side. The accused driver was 
agitated, nervous, and his eyes were bloodshot and 
glassy. The officer suspected he may be impaired by 
alcohol or some other stimulant but was not close 
enough to detect a liquor odour. The officer asked the 
accused if he had consumed any alcohol and whether he 
had any in the vehicle. Spontaneously, the accused 
exited his vehicle and said, “Go ahead and search the 
car”. The accused, whose movements were rapid and 
jerky, spoke quickly, and routinely shifted his weight, 
giving the officer the impression he was very agitated 
and nervous. As a result of his behaviour and the fact 
the accused continued to focus attention to searching 
the vehicle, the officer suspected that the accused 
may be concealing something on his person. 
 
The officer noted a bulge in the accused’s left spandex 
pants which raised a concern he was concealing a 
weapon. However, in response to being asked whether 
he had any weapons, the accused responded in the 
agitation, there was no evidence that the conduct, 
objectively viewed, was sufficient to arouse the 
officer’s concern for his safety. As a consequence, the 
search was unreasonable. However, the evidence was 
admitted because its admission would not bring the 
administration of justice into disrepute. The officer 
acted “in good faith on his subjective belief that there 
was immediate necessity to protect his safety and that 
of his partner”. 
 
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca. 
 
TRAFFICKING COMPLETE ON 
OFFER TO SELL: INTENTION 
TO COMPLETE TRANSACTION 
NOT REQUIRED 
R. v. Bell, 2002 ABCA 107 
 
During a conversation with the 
c
r
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June 2002 accused about the purchase of sex 
for money, the accused quoted a 
price for drugs after an undercover 
officer inquired about purchasing 
ocaine. The officer left but later returned and 
eiterated his desire to purchase the cocaine. The 
11
 accused informed the officer that it would cost $50 
for the drugs and $20 for delivery. The officer left to 
make change for a $100 bill. Upon returning, the 
officer gave the accused $50 with the understanding 
that she would receive $20 upon delivery of the 
cocaine. The accused walked away but never returned. 
The accused was convicted of trafficking and appealed 
to the Alberta Court of Appeal arguing that the Crown 
failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that she had 
the necessary mens rea; an intention to actually 
traffic. Since the actus reus of the offence is an offer 
to sell, the mens rea only requires an intention to offer 
to sell, not proof of intent to actually sell. Thus, an 
offer to sell is complete once the offer is made and 
does not require proof the accused intended on 
completing the sale and delivery. The appeal was 
dismissed and the conviction upheld. 
 
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca. 
 
NO PRIVACY INTEREST IN 
SEARCH OF 3rd PARTY 
R. v. Parchment, 2002 BCCA 252 
 
The accused, in company a 14-year-
dismissing this suggestion, Braidwood, J.A. for the 
unanimous British Columbia Court of Appeal stated: 
 
[The accused] did not have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in these circumstances. We are dealing here with 
narcotics hidden in the front of the pants worn by a 14-
year-old minor female. I agree with Crown counsel's 
suggestion that to hold otherwise would offend not only 
the law, but also common sense and basic human dignity. 
Objectively speaking, the appellant had absolutely no 
rational reason to expect any privacy in these 
circumstances. 
 
The accused also argued that the search of the youth 
was not properly conducted as an incident to her lawful 
arrest. In rejecting this argument, the Court found the 
accused had no standing to challenge the search of the 
youth. The appeal was dismissed. 
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca 
 
CLIMAX NOT NECESSARY TO 
PROVE ACT OF 
PROSTITUTION 
R. v. Ni, Li, & Jin,  
(2002) Docket:C33765 (OntCA) 
old female youth, packaged cocaine 
and heroin at a residence where he 
stored his bulk drugs. After the 
packaging was complete, the accused asked the youth 
to hold the drugs for him. The two left the residence 
in a vehicle driven by the accused, which was 
subsequently stopped by the police as a suspected 
impaired driver after the vehicle failed to stop at an 
intersection. After directing the youth to step from 
the vehicle, the officer detected an odour of 
marihuana and placed her under arrest. After asking 
her if she had anything on her person the police should 
be concerned about, the youth produced a baggie 
containing 17.2 grams of cocaine and 3.8 grams of 
heroin from the front of her pants. She told the police 
they were the accused’s drugs and that she was holding 
them for him. She also produced a small quantity of 
cocaine from her bra which she informed police she 
received in exchange for helping the accused package 
the drugs. The accused was convicted of possession of 
a controlled substance for the purpose of trafficking.  
 
The accused appealed his conviction arguing that he 
had a reasonable expectation of privacy in relation to 
his drugs found in the front pants of the youth. In 
 
The Ontario Court of Appeal 
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appealed the acquittals of the 
accused on charges of keeping a 
common bawdy house and being 
nmates thereof. A plainclothes police officer attended 
 massage parlor where one of the accused offered to 
erform or attempt to perform acts of masturbation 
pon him. Police attended on several occasions over a 
eriod of several days and the offers of masturbation 
ontinued. The Appeal Court found the trial judge 
rred in directing a verdict of acquittal because there 
as sufficient evidence that a trier of fact could find 
he masturbation was “part and parcel” of the body 
ub, and that there was frequent and habitual use of 
he premises. Masturbation for payment for the sexual 
ratification of the customers can amount to acts of 
rostitution. The Court also rejected the accused’s 
ssertion that there must be proof of actual climax 
efore the conduct can properly be characterized as 
cts as prostitution.  
omplete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca 
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 POLICE ACADEMY OFFERS 
ON-LINE COURSE IN 
‘WORKPLACE STRESS, 
BURNOUT & TRAUMA’ 
 
The consequences of workplace 
stress are a serious problem in law 
enforcement.  Workers are 
subjected to both systemic 
stresses (i.e., job stress, burnout, 
discrimination and sexual harassment) and traumatic 
stresses (i.e., primary and secondary traumatic 
stresses), which jointly increase the risk for negative 
effects on individuals and organizations. The Police 
Academy at the Justice Institute of British Columbia 
now offers two, eight-week online courses designed 
especially for law enforcement staff needing access to 
flexible training on this important issue.   
 
The Road Back to Wellness: Stress, Burnout & Trauma 
in Law Enforcement (for frontline staff), and The 
Managers Guide to Stress, Burnout & Trauma in Law 
Enforcement are each based on Dr. Patricia Fisher's 
(Clinical & Consulting Psychologist) popular workbook-
based programs. The online study guides provide 
automated assessment scoring and a trained online 
facilitator to accompany the course text.  
 
These courses are designed for everyone who currently 
works in a law enforcement capacity.  Course 
participants will:  
 
• gain an understanding and awareness of the 
background issues of stress and trauma;  
• obtain a detailed evaluation of their personal levels 
of risk, self-care, and symptoms using the 19 auto-
scoring online self-tests; and   
• develop a personal wellness plan using the 
comprehensive set of tools and strategies provided 
 
Participants will be able to evaluate their personal 
levels of risk, self-care, and symptoms as well as 
identify tools and strategies to develop and maintain 
effective personal wellness plans. 
 
Course Dates 
 
• The Road Back to Wellness: Stress, Burnout & 
Trauma in Law Enforcement (course POL791) 
October 28, 2002 to December 20, 2002. (guided 
self-paced online course) 
• The Managers Guide to Stress, Burnout & 
Trauma in Law Enforcement (course POL792) 
October 28, 2002 to December 20, 2002 (guided 
self-paced online course) 
 
Registration  
 
• Register by October 20, 2002 
• Tuition fee: $485 CDN each course 
• Register by telephone (604) 528-5590 
• Visa or Mastercard accepted 
 
For more information, please e-mail 
mlalonde@jibc.bc.ca or check our website at 
www.jibc.bc.ca 
 
ACCUSED AWARDED COSTS 
FOR FAILURE OF CROWN TO 
DISCLOSE WITNESS 
INTERVIEW NOTES  
R. v. Logan,  
(2002) Docket:C354976 (OntCA) 
 
An assistant Crown Counsel took 
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witness on the prosecution of a 
manslaughter retrial. Without an 
adequate explanation, six months 
ater and two weeks after the trial had begun and 
early all the Crown evidence had been adduced, 
isclosure of the interview notes was made. A trial 
udge held that the non-disclosure of the notes had 
rejudiced the accused’s ability to make full answer 
nd defence because the notes of the interview and 
he earlier statement of the witness were significantly 
ifferent. The trial judge ordered a stay of 
roceedings along with the costs of the application for 
he stay and for the motion for costs. The Crown 
ppealed the trial judge’s order, arguing that the 
nadvertent non-disclosure of the notes was not made 
n “circumstances of a marked and unacceptable 
eparture from the reasonable standards expected of 
he prosecution”. In dismissing the appeal, the Ontario 
ourt of Appeal held the notes should have been 
utomatically disclosed and without an adequate 
xplanation, the measured remedy of awarding costs 
or failing to disclose the notes was reasonable.  
omplete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca 
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 IN-HOME ARREST LAWFUL: 
POLICE PRESENCE JUSTIFIED 
WHILE EXECUTING WARRANT 
Townsend v. Sault Ste. Marie Police 
Service et al, 
(2002) Docket:C36850 (OntCA) 
 
The plaintiff brought an action 
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Under the circumstances, this evidence was highly 
prejudicial and should not have been allowed. 
 
Furthermore, the trial judge failed to fully answer the 
jury’s questions about the element of control in proving 
possession offences. Because the Crown was relying on 
constructive possession, they were required to prove 
control as an element of the offence. Although the 
Appeal Court refused to enter an acquittal, the appeal 
Court ordered a new trial. There was evidence upon 
V
Jagainst a police service and some of 
its officers, which was summarily 
dismissed by a court. The plaintiff 
ppealed the dismissal of the action to the Ontario 
ourt of Appeal arguing, in part, that the judge failed 
o properly address his claims of false arrest and false 
mprisonment. The plaintiff argued that the police did 
ot have reasonable grounds to make a proper arrest 
nd further, that the police were trespassing at the 
ime they made the in-home arrest. In rejecting both 
f these claims, Ontario’s high court found there 
xisted lawful grounds for the arrest. Furthermore, 
ecause the police were lawfully present in the dwelling 
y virtue of a search warrant, they were not 
respassing at the time they made the arrest. Thus, 
he arrest was lawful. The plaintiff’s appeal was 
ismissed. 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca 
OPINION EVIDENCE BASED ON 
INADMISSIBLE HEARSAY 
IMPROPER 
R. v. Maurice, 
(2002) Docket:C34938 (OntCA) 
The accused appealed his conviction 
which a properly instructed jury could still convict 
because the drugs were in plain view in a large plastic 
package on the back seat of the accused’s car.  
 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca 
 
OVEREMPHASIS ON 
DETERRENCE: CUSTODY 
SUBSTITUTED BY 
CONDITIONAL SENTENCE 
R. v. Whyte, 20002 BCCA 293 
 
The accused, a 35-year-old first 
time offender, received a sentence 
of 12 months imprisonment resulting 
from a conviction of possession of 
marihuana for the purpose of 
trafficking after police found several hundred 
marihuana plants in his home. He successfully appealed 
his term of custody, which was substituted by the 
British Columbia Court of Appeal with a conditional 
sentence of two years less a day. The underlying 
principles of sentencing recognize that the 
incarceration of first time offenders for non-violent 
crimes should be avoided, if possible. In this case, the 
trial judge failed to give enough weight to this 
principle. He properly considered the importance of for possession of drugs arguing, in 
part, that the Crown improperly lead 
inadmissible opinion evidence from a 
police intelligence officer based on 
earsay. At trial, the intelligence officer testified that 
he “[accused’s] car was briefly seen at a house 
ccupied by persons suspected, based on informer 
nformation, of being drug traffickers and associated 
ith a motorcycle gang suspected of controlling drug 
rafficking in the…area”. The Ontario Court of Appeal 
ound this evidence nothing less than an attempt to 
stablish guilt by association and infer knowledge. 
olume 2 Issue 6 
une 2002 deterrence but “overlooked” the deterrent effect of 
conditional sentences containing “very severe 
restrictions on liberty”, which should be sufficient to 
deter others considering growing marihuana. 
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca 
 
Note-able Quote 
 
“Remember not only to say the right thing in the right 
place, but far more difficult still, to leave unsaid the 
wrong thing at the tempting moment”. Benjamin 
Franklin 
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 NO STANDING TO 
CHALLENGE WARRANT AFTER 
DROPPING KEYS 
R. v. Luong, 2002 BCPC 0135 
 
Police, investigating a theft from 
To successfully challenge the search warrant, the 
accused would first need to establish a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the home. Maughan J. 
inferred that the accused knew the police were 
investigating the house because he dropped the keys 
after having both walked and ran from the premises 
which signified a desire to avoid detection. In dropping 
the keys, the accused “intended to relinquish any right auto and a stolen van, attended a 
home after witnesses told them that 
a male was seen leaving the house 
and enter the stolen van, which was 
later recovered unoccupied by police. Upon arrival at 
the house, the officers could see the lights to the main 
floor were on, but it appeared vacant. On the second 
floor, they could see a person seated on a couch near a 
sliding window who appeared to be watching television. 
Police knocked but received no response. One of the 
officers attended to the rear of the residence and saw 
a parked vehicle registered to the accused. The officer 
knocked at the rear of the residence but also received 
no reply. After returning to the front, the officer 
noted that the person seated on the couch was no 
longer there.  
 
The officer returned to the rear of the house where 
an elderly female at a neighbouring house pointed down 
the laneway. The officer noted that the rear gate was 
now unlatched and slightly open. The officer entered 
the lane way and observed a lone male walking in the 
lane. The officer shone his flashlight and the male 
turned and went out of view. The officer jogged up the 
lane, turned the corner, and found the accused running. 
The male stopped running, but continued walking after 
the officer again shone his flashlight. The officer 
jogged up to the male and asked him to stop. The 
officer believed the accused was the same person seen 
in the window. The two then walked back to the 
residence.  
 
While outside of the home, the officer observed the 
accused drop a set of keys from his hand. When asked, 
the accused denied ownership of the keys and that 
they would not open the doors to the house. A second 
officer tried the keys to the home and upon unlocking 
the rear door, it opened and a strong smell of 
marihuana was detected. The door was then closed and 
the accused was arrested for growing marihuana. Police 
subsequently obtained a search warrant at the 
residence which the accused sought to challenge during 
a voire dire.  
 
to them and to the locks which they opened”. Further, 
“he relinquished his own access to the premises and 
relinquished his control over the access of others to 
the premises”.  Documents located by the police 
demonstrated that the accused did not live at the 
house and the circumstances of his presence tended to 
establish that he had no propriety interest in the 
home, but at best may have been an invitee. The only 
evidence linking the accused to the home was that the 
officer’s believed he was the person watching 
television and who would not respond to knocking, left 
out the back only to be stopped by the police, had keys 
that opened a lock, and was the owner of a vehicle 
parked in the back but not registered to the house.  
 
Although the accused may be a party to the offence of 
producing marihuana by watering the plants or setting 
up equipment, he had little or no expectation of privacy 
in the house. Having failed to establish a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the residence, the accused 
had no standing to challenge the search warrant. 
 
Complete case available at www.provincialcourt.bc.ca 
 
OIC MUST MAKE REASONABLE 
ENQUIRY BEFORE 
CONTINUING DETENTION   
R. v. Simmons, 2002 BCPC 0144 
 
An experienced police officer 
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June 2002 attended a minor motor vehicle 
accident where the accused was 
found in the driver’s seat of one of 
the vehicles. The officer demanded 
the accused provide breath samples after forming the 
opinion that the accused had committed the offences 
of impaired driving and driving while over 80mg%. The 
accused was transported to the police station where he 
provided samples of 210 mg% and 200mg% 
respectively. The officer was of the opinion that the 
accused could be released if he took a taxi home and if 
someone was there to receive him.  He described the 
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 accused as a seasoned drinker who could hold his liquor. 
Despite the investigating officer’s intention to release 
the accused, the officer in charge (OIC), who was 
aware of the readings but never saw or was in the same 
room as the accused, aborted any plan for release. The 
accused’s request to speak to the supervisor for an 
explanation of why he was not being released was 
refused. The accused was subsequently released 6 
hours after the investigator concluded he should have 
been.  
 
The accused argued that his Charter rights under s.7 
and s.9 were violated because he was arbitrarily 
detained and that a judicial stay of proceedings would 
be an appropriate remedy. Section 498 of the Criminal 
Code, although not a formal bail hearing, does require 
some enquiry by the OIC – however brief and informal -
- when deciding whether to release a person from 
custody or continue their detention. In this case, at 
least looking at, talking to, or giving him an opportunity 
to be heard would be reasonable to ensure the most 
basic level of procedural fairness.  Gove J. found the 
continued detention in this case was arbitrary and 
ordered a judicial stay of proceedings.  
 
Complete case available at www.provincialcourt.bc.ca 
 
CAPABILITY & OPPORTUNITY 
TO MOVE VEHICLE AMOUNTS 
TO CARE & CONTROL 
R. v. Laurie, 2002 ABPC 68 
 
A police officer responding to a 
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further testified he had not driven the vehicle nor had 
any intention to do so.  
 
In finding the accused guilty, the trial judge held that 
the accused was in care and control regardless of his 
intentions. The vehicle was running, capable of being 
driven, and the accused was awake in the driver’s seat. 
Care and control can include circumstances where an 
accused could perform acts involving the vehicle, its 
fittings, or equipment, which may unintentionally set it 
in motion. Horrocks J. stated, “a person familiar with 
the vehicle may well perform the minor actions 
required to set the car in motion reflexively or 
accidentally”. In this case, the evidence of him being 
behind the wheel and throwing the beer can out the 
window clearly indicated he had taken control. The 
accused was “awake and had both the capability and 
opportunity to move the vehicle”. Regardless of the 
presumption found in s.258 of the Criminal Code, de 
facto (actual) care and control had been proven.  
 
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca 
 
AUTHORIZED POLICE REVIEW 
OF 3RD PARTY RECORD DOES 
NOT REDUCE PRIVACY 
EXPECTATION 
R. v W.G.G.,  
(2002) Docket:C35398 (OntCA) 
 
The accused appealed his conviction 
on two counts of indecent assault 
V
Jcomplaint found the accused talking 
on a cell phone behind the wheel of 
his pickup parked off the roadway in 
among some trees. The engine was 
unning, the radio was playing loudly, and the vehicle 
as drivable. An empty can of beer was found outside 
he driver’s door. The accused subsequently provided 
reath samples of 140mg%. The accused testified that 
omeone he knew, but could only describe in vague 
erms, drove his vehicle while he was the passenger. 
uring the drive he took out a beer from one of two 
lats he had purchased earlier and started to drink it. 
e could remember nothing more until his cell phone 
wakened him. He sat up and slid across into the 
river’s seat and was only on the phone for about a 
inute before being interrupted by the police. He 
olume 2 Issue 6 
une 2002 against his two step-daughters 
arguing, among other grounds, that 
the trial judge erred when he 
dismissed the accused’s application to review the 
records of one of the complainants held by a third 
party, the Children’s Aid Society. In part, the accused 
argued that the complainant’s expectation of privacy in 
the record’s had been reduced because she signed an 
authorization allowing the police to review them. The 
Ontario Court of Appeal held “the fact that the police 
reviewed the records with the complainant’s 
authorization had no bearing on her expectation of 
privacy as it related to the [accused]”. Both the 
accused’s conviction and sentence appeal were 
dismissed. 
 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca 
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 OBLITERATED DATE & TIME 
ON FAX WARRANT 
UNREASONABLE 
R. v. Steeves, 2002 BCSC 551 
 
The accused, who was charged with 
was not serious, the officer did not act in bad faith, 
and the administration of justice would not be brought 
into disrepute.  
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca 
 
THREATS MUST BE MADE 
WITH INTENT TO BE TAKEN possession of marihuana for the 
purpose of trafficking after police 
executed a search warrant on his 
residence, sought to have the 
evidence excluded on the basis the warrant was 
defective and invalid. After obtaining the necessary 
reasonable grounds justifying a search, the police 
prepared an information to obtain a search warrant by 
telecommunication pursuant to s. 487.1 of the Criminal 
Code, consisting of a printed form and an appendix 
setting out the grounds, because there was no Justice 
of the Peace personally available. The documents were 
faxed to the judicial centre in Vancouver and a warrant 
to search was subsequently provided by fax. Police 
attended the accused’s residence and as a result of the 
search located 30-40 marihuana plants and a quantity 
of marihuana drying on a patio screen door. A copy of 
the search warrant was left on the kitchen table of the 
residence. 
 
The accused argued, among other grounds, that the 
month, date, and time, located near the Justice of the 
Peace’s signature on the fax copy of the warrant was 
obliterated by a black marking and was not readable.  
The warrant forwarded by the Justice of the Peace to 
the court registry had the same black marking, but the 
month, date, and time were not obliterated. The 
officer testified that he noted the blacked out space 
on the warrant at the time but was more concerned 
about the time of and place he was permitted to 
search.  
 
Section 487.1(8) of the Criminal Code requires that the 
police cause a “true copy” of the warrant be left at the 
premises searched. Since the month, date, and time 
were not readable and therefore not contained in the 
copy left at the accused’s residence, the warrant was 
not a facsimile (or exact copy) and the mandatory 
requirements of the Code were not met. As such, 
British Columbia Supreme Court Justice Chamberlist 
found a breach of the accused’s s.8 Charter right to be 
secure against unreasonable search or seizure.  
However, in addressing the s.24(2) analysis the Court 
admitted the evidence of the marihuana. The violation 
SERIOUSLY 
R. v. Hiscox, 2002 BCCA 312 
 
The accused was arrested and taken 
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June 2002 to a hospital by the police under 
s.28 of the Mental Health Act for a 
psychiatric assessment after he had 
alled a crisis hotline suggesting he had a gun and was 
oing to shoot himself. During the assessment, the 
ccused was asked by the attending physician to 
xpress his thoughts. The accused said he was very 
ngry with his former girlfriend for breaking up with 
im and at her friends for encouraging the breakup.  
e said he recently bought a gun and he was intending 
n getting revenge on his former girlfriend and her 
riends. Furthermore, he stated he was considering 
lashing his former girlfriend’s throat or forcing her 
ff the road. The physician took the remarks very 
eriously and felt “somewhat afraid”. Since the 
hysician could find no basis for detaining the accused 
nder the Mental Health Act, he called the police with 
is concerns. The accused was charged with uttering 
hreats under s.264.1(1)(a) of the Criminal Code and 
as convicted at trial. The accused appealed to the 
ritish Columbia Court of Appeal arguing that the trial 
udge misdirected himself to the mens rea element of 
he offence.    
he actus reus of s.264.1 is the uttering of threats of 
eath or serious bodily harm while the mens rea 
omponent is that they were meant to intimidate or to 
e taken seriously; it is not necessary to prove the 
ntent to carry out the threat. The trial judge found 
he words spoken amounted to a threat and that the 
ccused intended on carrying it out. In this case, the 
ppeal Court agreed that the accused uttered words 
hat constituted words of threats. However, it was 
nclear from the evidence of the physician whether 
he words were spoken with the intent to be taken 
eriously or simply as an expression of thoughts 
ithout any intent that they be taken as a threat. 
ince the judge misapplied the law in framing the 
uestion as whether the accused intended on carrying 
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 out the threat instead of whether the words spoken 
were intended to be taken seriously or to intimidate, 
the conviction was set aside and a new trial was 
ordered. 
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca 
 
NO NEED TO CHARTER  
DRIVER DURING TRAFFIC 
INVESTIGATION 
R. v. Stellitano, 2002 SKQB 199 
 
Police observed the accused lose 
control of his vehicle as he 
fishtailed around a curve. After 
regaining control and proceeding 
through the intersection where the 
officers were stopped, he was pulled over by the police. 
The accused told the officer that he had just had a 
fight with his girlfriend and was angry.   Unsatisfied 
with the explanation, the officer advised him he was 
being taken to the police car while they investigated 
him for speeding and possible dangerous driving. The 
accused was placed in the rear of the police car and 
was questioned about the consumption of alcohol 
before any Charter rights were provided. The accused 
acknowledged he had been previously drinking which 
caused the officer to form a reasonable suspicion the 
accused had alcohol in his body and he demanded a 
roadside screening test. The accused failed and a 
demand for breath samples was made. It was at this 
time the accused was informed of his right to counsel. 
The accused was convicted of driving over 80mg%. 
 
The accused appealed his conviction to the 
Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench arguing that he 
was entitled to be informed of his right to counsel at 
the moment the officer advised him he was being 
investigated for a possible dangerous driving charge 
and failure to do so was a breach of his s.10(b) Charter 
right to be informed without delay. Since the question 
which formed the basis for the officer’s suspicion that 
the accused had alcohol in his body preceded any 
warning, its admission into the trial would be unfair. 
The Crown contended that the detention was lawful 
under Saskatchewan’s Highway Traffic Act (s.40(8)) 
and no warning or right to counsel is required before 
questioning about alcohol consumption. Crown suggested 
that no obligation arises to advise of the right to 
counsel when demanding a roadside screening test at 
the reasonable suspicion stage. The right to counsel 
only arises when a decision is made to demand 
breathalyzer samples.  
 
Krueger J. found the questioning of the driver about 
alcohol consumption, for the purpose of achieving 
safety on the highways, without informing him of his 
right to counsel was a reasonable limit under s.1 of the 
Charter. At para 11, the Court stated: 
 
The officer had not embarked upon a new or different 
investigation that required him to inform the appellant of 
his Charter right to counsel. If the questions asked had 
led the officer to believe on reasonable grounds that a 
dangerous driving offence had been committed, he would 
have been obliged to then comply with ss. 10(a) and (b) of 
the Charter. That did not occur. Instead the officer 
obtained reasonable grounds to believe that a drinking 
and driving offence had been committed. Once he had 
reasonable grounds for that belief, he was entitled to 
make a demand for samples of breath to be analysed on 
an approved machine and was obliged to advise the 
appellant of his Charter right to counsel. I see no 
distinction between a dangerous driving investigation and 
an impaired driving investigation. Nor does an 
investigation of one offence prevent gathering evidence 
on the other. Rights to counsel arise when a decision is 
made to pursue a charge. 
 
The appeal was dismissed and the conviction upheld. 
 
Complete case available at www.lawsociety.sk.ca 
 
MISTAKE OF LAW NO DEFENCE 
TO POLICE ENTRY 
Hudson v. Brantford Police Services Board, 
(2001) Docket:C34963 (OntCA) 
 
Two police officers attended the 
Volume 2 Issue 6 
June 2002 apartment of the plaintiff and his 
mother to arrest him for a hit and 
run involving a parked vehicle that 
occurred a short time earlier. The 
plaintiff’s mother answered the door in response to the 
officer’s knocking and the officers entered, without 
consent, and went to the plaintiff’s bedroom where he 
was awaken. There was no arrest warrant or 
authorization to enter, no hot pursuit, or no exigent 
circumstances under s.529.3 of the Criminal Code 
permitting warrantless entry. A scuffle ensued and the 
plaintiff was subsequently handcuffed and removed 
from the bedroom. While being escorted from the 
apartment, the plaintiff spat at one of the arresting 
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 officers and, at the police station, spat at a Staff 
Sergeant. He was charged with hit and run, resisting 
arrest x 2, and assaulting a police officer in the 
execution of their duty (spitting) x 2. He subsequently 
plead guilty to the two assault charges and the other 
charges were withdrawn. The plaintiff brought an 
action against the Police Services Board suing for 
unlawful arrest and detention. 
 
At trial, the Court found the entry into the apartment 
to be unlawful. Although the officers had sufficient 
reasonable grounds to make the arrest, they did not 
comply with the requirements of s.495(2) of the 
Criminal Code. Further, even though the officers were 
in the lawful execution of their duty at the time they 
were spit upon while transporting the plaintiff to the 
police station, his guilty plea did not bar the civil action 
for the unlawful warrantless entry and arrest, which 
was a separate event. However, the trial judge found 
the common law and s.25 of the Criminal Code 
protected the officers, who she described as acting in 
good faith, and dismissed the claim. 
 
The plaintiff appealed to a Divisional Court which 
allowed the appeal and remitted the matter back to the 
trial judge to determine damages. The Divisional Court 
judge found that the trial judge had erred in her 
finding of good faith because at least one of the 
officers had training on the warrantless entry 
amendments to the Code before the arrest. It did not 
matter whether the officers had sufficient reasonable 
grounds to justify the arrest; it was the unauthorized 
entry that made the arrest unlawful. 
 
The Police Services Board then appealed to the Ontario 
Court of Appeal arguing that the Divisional Court judge 
erred in setting aside the trial judge’s finding that the 
officers acted reasonably and in good faith. The Board 
argued that the police were justified under s.25 of the 
Criminal Code, or alternatively, under the common law 
for their actions. In R. v. Feeney (1997) 115 C.C.C. (3d) 
129, the Supreme Court of Canada held that prior 
authorization to enter is generally required to make an 
arrest in a dwelling house absent exceptional 
circumstances such as hot pursuit. In response, 
parliament enacted provisions in the Criminal Code that 
allow the police to obtain an entry warrant or 
authorization to enter. Since the police did not have 
consent, authorization to enter, or exigent 
circumstances, they committed a trespass when they 
entered the apartment which rendered the arrest 
unlawful.  
Application of s.25(1) Criminal Code 
 
Section 25(1) of the Criminal Code states: 
 
Every one who is required or authorized by law to do anything 
in the administration or enforcement of the law…(b) as a 
peace officer…is, if he acts on reasonable grounds, justified in 
doing what he is required or authorized to do and in using as 
much force as is necessary for that purpose. 
 
Rosenberg J.A., for the unanimous Ontario Court of 
Appeal, summarized the application of this section as 
follows:  
 
[Section 25(1)] provides that a peace officer who is 
authorized by law to do something in the enforcement of 
the law is justified in doing what he or she is authorized 
to do if the officer “acts on reasonable grounds”. In 
effect, s.25(1) protects the officer from civil liability 
for reasonable mistakes of fact and justifies the use of 
force. It does not protect against reasonable mistakes of 
law, such as mistake as to the authority to commit a 
trespass to effect an arrest. (emphasis added) 
 
If the officers had reasonably believed they had 
consent to enter the apartment even if in fact they did 
not, s.25(1) would have provided a defence. However, 
they did not have permission and no lawful right to 
enter to make the arrest. Even though they had ample 
reasonable grounds to justify the arrest and were 
acting in good faith, they did not have authorization to 
commit a trespass. Section 25(1) is not so broad as to 
protect a police officer who generally acts reasonably 
and in good faith. A defence found in this section “must 
be related to the specific conduct involved and the 
legality of the action the officer claims is “authorized 
by law” within the meaning of s.25(1)”. 
 
Application of s.25(2) Criminal Code 
 
Section 25(2) of the Criminal Code states: 
 
Where a person is required or authorized by law to execute a 
process or carry out a sentence, that person or any person 
who assists him is, if that person acts in good faith, justified 
in executing the process or in carrying out the sentence 
notwithstanding that the process or sentence is defective or 
that it was issued or imposed without jurisdiction or in excess 
of jurisdiction. 
 
This section absolves a police officer from civil liability 
if they act in good faith and reasonably believe that 
their actions are justified by law in executing a process 
which is later found to be defective. In this case, the 
law concerning the warrantless arrest of persons had 
been outlined by the Supreme Court of Canada and new 
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 Criminal Code provisions had been enacted. If the 
officers were mistakenly acting on the basis of pre-
Feeney law, s.25(2) offered no defence. It would not 
have been a defect in the law, but a mistake of law, 
that formed the basis for the officer’s actions. 
 
Application of the Common Law 
 
The Board further argued that the police were 
authorized under common law to enter the apartment 
because they satisfied the Waterfield test (common 
law ancillary power doctrine) by acting in the course of 
their duty when they entered the apartment and their 
conduct did not involve an unjustifiable use of police 
powers in the circumstances. The Court ruled that the 
police were not entitled to claim any common law power 
based upon Waterfield by ignoring the dictates of the 
Supreme Court of Canada, which had defined the rules 
of entry, simply because the police ”are generally 
acting in the course of their duties to keep the peace 
and apprehend perpetrators”.  
 
The actions of the police were not protected under 
s.25 of the Code nor at common law and the appeal by 
the Police Services Board was dismissed. 
 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca 
 
OFFICER’s DUTY TO INFORM, 
NOT PROVIDE ADVICE 
R. v. Jutras, 
(2001) 160 C.C.C. (3d) 113 (SaskCA) 
 
A police officer stopped the 
accused after he had driven into a 
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operator referred him to the investigating officer who 
subsequently permitted the accused to contact his 
father. After speaking to his father to seek his advice 
about whether he should call a lawyer, the accused 
submitted to the breath tests as his father suggested 
and blew 150mg% and 140mg%.  
 
At trial, the Court found the police had violated the 
accused’s right to counsel because he suffered from 
Attention Deficit Hyper Activity Disorder and the 
officer “failed to inform the accused at a time when he 
was capable of understanding and appreciating his right 
to counsel and what he should do as a result of that 
right”. Nevertheless, the trial judge admitted the 
results of the tests under s.24(2) of the Charter and 
convicted the accused. The accused appealed to the 
Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench where Dovell J. 
agreed that the accused’s rights had been violated, but 
ordered a new trial because the trial judge failed to 
properly apply the provisions of s.24(2) in admitting 
the evidence. On further appeal by Crown, the 
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal stated, at para. 20: 
 
[The officer] properly informed [the accused] of his 
right to counsel immediately upon demanding samples of 
his breath and then effectively afforded him an 
opportunity to exercise that right once at the police 
station. He did this at a time when [the accused] was 
capable of understanding – and indeed understood – that 
it was open to him to take the advice of a lawyer before 
complying with the demand. As a result, [the accused] 
was aware of his predicament, appreciated his 
constitutional right to consult counsel, and knew the 
means were at hand by which he could exercise that 
right. Indeed, he expressly declined the opportunity to 
call a lawyer, this at a time when there was no suggestion 
whatever that he did not fully appreciate the situation. 
V
Jditch and back onto the road. After 
forming an opinion, the officer 
demanded the accused provide 
amples of his breath. This was followed by the officer 
nforming the accused of his right to retain and 
nstruct counsel and that he could call a lawyer from 
he police station. The accused, who was calm and 
ooperative, acknowledged understanding and quietly 
ccompanied the officer. At the station, the accused 
eclined the offer of the use of a telephone and was 
sked to take a seat while awaiting the arrival of the 
TA operator. The accused became increasingly upset 
nd uncooperative and was acting strangely. As the 
irst test was about to be administered, the accused 
sked the BTA operator, “What can a lawyer do for 
e? What can a family member do for me?”. The 
 
Moreover, the officer’s duty was to inform the accused 
of his rights, not to provide advice of what he should 
or should not do. When the accused became agitated 
and confused, his confusion was confined to what he 
should do (call a lawyer or not) and not what he could 
do (call a lawyer if he wanted). Having found no breach 
of the accused’s s.10 Charter rights, the unanimous 
Appeal Court restored the conviction. 
 
Complete case available at www.lawsociety.sk.ca 
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